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PATENT CARROTS AND STICKS: A MODEL OF 
NONOBVIOUSNESS 
by                                                                                                                   
Michael J. Meurer∗ and Katherine J. Strandburg** 
The authors develop an informal model of the impact of the nonobviousness 
standard on the choice of research projects. Previous models assume that the 
basic question confronting a researcher is, “Shall I produce this particular 
invention?” More realistically, the authors think a researcher asks, “Which 
research path shall I pursue?” The model shows that a patent serves as a 
carrot to induce the choice of more difficult projects than would be pursued 
under the no-patent alternative. The nonobviousness standard serves as a 
stick to prod researchers to choose even more difficult projects. The results of 
the model help us understand why a fact-intensive issue like obviousness is a 
question of law. The model also helps us understand the optimal 
relationship between the nonobviousness standard and patentable subject-
matter exclusions. Commentators often suggest subject-matter exclusions are 
unnecessary if the nonobviousness standard is used appropriately. The 
authors’ model suggests this intuition is wrong for inventions characterized 
by large social spillovers and high social costs of patenting; a simple subject-
matter exclusion would be more efficient. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The question of obviousness is central to determining patentability, 
yet what it means for an invention to be obvious in light of relevant prior 
art is one of the most difficult puzzles in patent law. The Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.1 
overturned the Federal Circuit’s rigid reliance on the “teaching, 
suggestion, motivation” test for obviousness. In KSR the Court reaffirmed 
the general framework laid out in the Supreme Court’s seminal Graham 
v. John Deere Co.2 opinion in which nonobviousness is a question of law to 
be evaluated in light of underlying factual inquiries related to the context 
in which invention occurred. Importantly, KSR clarified that obviousness 
must be assessed in light of a context of normal baseline innovation in a 
particular technical field and assuming a level of ordinary creativity.3 
The KSR decision clears the way for new thinking about the 
obviousness issue, which, despite its importance, is surprisingly under-
theorized. Most scholarly discussions are very informal, simply listing the 
tradeoffs involved in setting the level of inventive step required for 
patentability.4 For the most part, the decision whether to make a 
 
1 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). 
2 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966). 
3 127 S. Ct. at 1741–42, 1746. 
4 For earlier scholarly commentary on obviousness see, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, 
Internet Business Model Patents: Obvious by Analogy, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
253 (2001); John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475 (2003); Rebecca 
Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success 
and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 
805 (1988) [hereinafter Merges, Commercial Success]; John F. Duffy, 
Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2007); Edmund 
W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere: New Standards for Patents, 1966 
SUP. CT. REV. 293; R. Polk Wagner and Katherine J. Strandburg, Debate, The 
Obviousness Requirement in the Patent Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 96 (2006), available at 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/obviousness/Wagner_Strandburg_Debate.pdf
. For more formal models see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. 
& TECH. L. REV. 363 (2000); Robert P Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of 
Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L. J. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Merges, Uncertainty]. For 
empirical studies see Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an 
Evidentiary Lens: The “Suggestion Test” as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1517 
(2006) [hereinafter Cotropia, Patent Law]; Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness 
and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
911 (2007); Sean M. McEldowney, New Insights on the “Death” of Obviousness: An 
Empirical Study of District Court Obviousness Opinions, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4; Lee 
Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical 
Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051 (2007); Gregory Mandel, 
Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court 
in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1 (Fall, 2006–2007); Gregory N. Mandel, 
Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent 
Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006). See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO 
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND 
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particular invention is conceptualized as an isolated yes or no choice 
depending simply on whether inventive costs exceed benefits captured by 
the inventor. We introduce a model of the nonobviousness threshold 
that reflects a somewhat more realistic view. In our model, we assume 
that research projects are selected by a research manager, who evaluates 
the potential payoff of various approaches to a particular objective. Thus, 
we assume that the basic question confronting a researcher is not “Shall I 
produce this invention?”, but rather “Which research path shall I 
pursue?” 
In this Symposium Article, we explore three insights which arise 
from considering a simple version of our model in which a research 
manager chooses from among various independent research approaches 
to a particular objective. While patent protection serves as a “carrot” to 
induce greater technological advance, the nonobviousness threshold can 
serve as a “stick” to induce more ambitious, socially optimal research 
projects than would otherwise be pursued. 
We argue first that a nonobviousness threshold serves at least two 
important purposes: Along traditional lines, our patenting model 
provides an incentive to pursue more costly inventions by allowing 
inventors to appropriate more of the value of their inventions. A 
nonobviousness threshold ensures that patents do not encumber 
technologies for which non-patent-based incentives are sufficient.5 Over 
and above this traditional justification, our model suggests that the 
nonobviousness requirement serves another very important purpose 
where, as is realistically nearly always the case, the social value of research 
projects substantially exceeds their private value. When this is the case, 
the socially preferable level of invention exceeds the privately optimal 
choice even when patents are available at both levels. The nonobviousness 
threshold may be used as a “stick” to induce researchers to pursue more 
difficult, socially preferred research projects. 
Second, the model aids in understanding why and in what sense 
obviousness must be deemed a question of law. In Graham, the Supreme 
Court held that “the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law,”6 
which, as it pertains to obviousness, “lends itself to several basic factual 
inquiries.”7 The Court thus established obviousness as a question of law to 
 
POLICY (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; 
STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2004). See generally Symposium, Nonobviousness—The Shape of Things to Come, 
12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 323 (2008). 
5 See, e.g., KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1746 (“And as progress beginning from higher levels 
of achievement is expected in the normal course, the results of ordinary innovation 
are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise 
patents might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts”). Merges, 
Uncertainty supra note 4; Lunney, supra note 4; Wagner and Strandburg, supra note 4 
(Strandburg argument). 
6 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (1966). 
7 Id. 
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be resolved in light of specific factual predicates, a standard reiterated by 
the Federal Circuit repeatedly since its inception.8 Nonetheless, it is far 
from clear what it means for obviousness to be a “question of law,” 
particularly in light of its highly technical nature. Our model suggests an 
interpretation of the nonobviousness requirement as highly policy-
dependent and intertwined with the social value (as well as the technical 
difficulty) of an inventive project. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
division of the issue between questions of fact regarding the technical 
context of invention and an ultimate legal determination of whether the 
inventive step is sufficient to warrant a patent, this interpretation helps us 
to understand the appropriate division of labor between courts, 
factfinders, and the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 
Third, our model sheds some light on the need for patentable 
subject matter restrictions. In some cases, the social costs of patenting 
may be sufficiently high that the social benefit of the greater 
technological step that can be induced by patenting’s carrots and sticks is 
not enough to offset the social cost of patent protection. Our model 
suggests that while advocates of patent protection for “anything under 
the sun that is made by man”9 are correct that patents will induce greater 
inventive steps, they are incorrect in assuming that this is always socially 
preferable. Society may be better off with a less ambitious series of 
inventive steps which contribute unpatented technology which is more 
widely and cheaply available. 
In Part II of the Article, we introduce our model and discuss its 
assumptions and limitations. We also compare our model to some earlier 
treatments of the obviousness question. In Part III, we explain how our 
model leads to a “carrots and sticks” view of the nonobviousness 
requirement and lay out (but do not explore in detail here) some of the 
considerations that would come into a practical application of this view of 
nonobviousness. In Part IV, we explain why our model contributes to 
understanding what it should mean for obviousness to be treated as a 
question of law. In Part V, we discuss how the social costs of patent 
protection play into the question of whether some types of inventions 
should be denied patent protection categorically, rather than evaluated 
for sufficient technical advance. The model helps to explain why a 
heightened nonobviousness standard is not necessarily an acceptable 
alternative to a doctrine of patentable subject matter. Part VI concludes 
by summarizing and briefly describing some limitations of the model. 
Elsewhere, we consider extensions of the model to address these 
 
8 A Lexis search for (“question of law” /s (obvious! or nonobvious!)) yields 169 
Federal Circuit cases spanning from November 23, 1983 to the present day (last 
performed Apr. 16, 2008). 
9 See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 946 (1999) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 
(1952))). See also, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and 
Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV 55 (2003). 
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limitations and explore the implications of the model for nonobviousness 
doctrine in more detail.10 
II. A MODEL OF RESEARCH AND NONOBVIOUSNESS 
We start this Article with a model of research, patenting, and the 
nonobviousness requirement. The model takes an ex ante perspective, 
asking how a research manager would go about choosing from a number 
of different projects aimed in a particular technological direction. Our 
model yields several insights into how patent policy affects an innovator’s 
choice of research projects. First, the grant of a patent, even when there 
is no test of obviousness, serves as a “carrot” that induces firms to choose 
more difficult research projects than they would choose in the absence of 
a possible patent. Second, the patent carrot may be insufficient to induce 
the choice of the socially optimal research project, and the 
nonobviousness standard can be used as a “stick” to push firms to 
undertake more difficult research projects. Third, the rigor of the 
nonobviousness standard is limited by the reality that firms must prefer 
patenting to not patenting. If pursuing a nonobvious research project is 
too costly, then firms will simply opt out of patenting and pursue less 
costly projects. When the social cost of a patent is too high, then the best 
policy is to prohibit patenting and let non-patent-based private incentives 
guide the choice of research project. 
A. Introduction to the Model 
Our model assumes a research entity with a particular general 
objective. Ex ante, there may be several possible research projects aimed 
at that objective. To be concrete, let us consider a stylized story of the 
invention of the incandescent light bulb.11 Specifically, suppose in 1878 a 
potential inventor had a general goal of inventing a better filament that 
would improve the quality of existing light bulbs and possibly make them 
commercially feasible. We can sketch a range of possible research 
projects that the potential inventor could choose from.12 He might work 
with platinum filaments. Platinum worked in earlier light bulbs but it was 
expensive and has a relatively low melting point. The potential inventor 
might experiment with different structures of platinum filaments, or 
develop a combination of platinum filaments and powdered charcoal. He 
might instead try to improve the carbonized paper filaments that had 
met with some earlier success. He might try tungsten or some other metal 
 
10 MICHAEL J. MEURER AND KATHERINE J. STRANDBURG, NONOBVIOUSNESS AND NERD 
CULTURE (work in progress). 
11 See The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895) for one part of the 
light bulb filament story. 
12 See, e.g., The Edison Papers, Electric Lamp, http://edison.rutgers.edu/ 
lamp.htm, for a description of the history of the development of incandescent light 
bulbs and filaments. 
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or alloy for the filament. Or he might follow the path of Thomas Edison 
and experiment with plant fibers and other carbon-based filaments.13 In 
this simplest version of our model, we assume that our research entity 
selects a single project and that sufficient funds may be borrowed to 
perform the research so that there is no budget constraint. Thus the 
research entity in our model will select the research project that, when 
viewed ex ante, maximizes its private expected return. In other words, the 
firm bases its planning on the ex ante expected costs and benefits of a 
given research path. 
We define y as the technical difficulty of the research project (or, 
alternatively, we order all potential projects by technical difficulty). In 
our model, we thus suppose that the projects that a researcher would 
consider to attack a particular objective can be ordered and arrayed 
along a horizontal axis as in Figure 1. To return to our light bulb 
filament example, we assume that conventional wisdom in 1878 could be 
used to order the potential projects in terms of difficulty. Perhaps the 
tungsten filament project (which met success about twenty years later) 
would be furthest to the right. Perhaps the carbonized paper filament 
project would be furthest to the left. The others would be somewhere in 
between. We believe that this ordering is generally feasible. In other 
words, if asked, people having ordinary skill in the art tend to agree on 
whether a particular research project is difficult or easy. They tend to 
agree on whether a particular project is likely to be cheap or costly, 
humdrum or exciting. Most importantly, we argue that this ex ante 
assessment of technical difficulty is what should be relevant for assessing 
obviousness.14 In our filament example, patent law should not ask 
whether a carbonized bamboo fiber is an obvious filament invention ex 
post. Rather, the law should take an ex ante perspective and ask whether a 
well managed research project investigating plant fibers as filaments 
would be easy or difficult (likely or unlikely to succeed). This perspective 
helps diminish the hindsight bias that might have occurred if Edison had 
been lucky and stumbled on his favored bamboo fiber in one of his first 
tests.15 
 
13 Edison held numerous patents on light bulb filaments. See The Edison Papers, 
Edison’s Patents, http://edison.rutgers.edu/patents.htm, for a list of all of Edison’s 
patents. 
14 We do not frame the obviousness inquiry in terms of the particular research 
path followed by an inventor ex post. When we speak about the inventor’s project, we 
are speaking about the objective of the research rather than its eventual path. For 
example, we suppose that Edison’s objective was to find an improved carbon-based 
filament, or perhaps to find a plant fiber that worked as an improved filament. Thus, 
our modeling approach is consistent with patent law. Patent law insists that 
obviousness is judged objectively from the perspective of the person having ordinary 
skill in the art (PHOSITA). Our standard focuses on the difficulty of the path or 
paths that PHOSITA might take to complete the inventor’s research project. 
15 Cf. Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 4, at, 38–39 (lucky inventions often occur in 
the context of a costly research project and they should not be categorically excluded 
from patent protection). 
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Given a particular research path, y, we denote the expected cost of a 
project c(y). The expected private value of the research depends on 
whether the firm gets a patent after successfully completing the project, 
among other things. We denote the expected private value of y when the 
firm does not expect to get a patent on the technical improvement 
resulting from the research project y as v(y), and the expected private 
value when a firm expects a patent to be available as V(y). Because the 
success of a particular research project is at least somewhat uncertain, 
both v(y) and V(y) are discounted by the probability of success. The 
expected profit from the project y is thus v(y) – c(y) without a patent and 
V(y ) – c(y) with a patent. At present, we assume that each research project 
leads to a different technical result. Thus, in the example of the light 
bulb filaments, one project leads to a platinum filament, one to a 
carbonized paper filament, and so forth. It is natural to assume that 
expected cost and expected private value increase as y increases.16 While 
it might turn out, for example, that a brilliant scientist has an insight that 
solves a technically difficult problem in one afternoon or that a 
technically “easy” approach requires very expensive, but routine 
experimentation, we think that, for a given technical objective, costs 
expected ex ante will ordinarily increase with technical difficulty, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. The assumption that the expected value of a 
research project increases with technical difficulty may not always be 
correct in fact, but we think that it is sufficiently embedded in the 
justification for a patent system that is intended to encourage technical 
progress to be justified for our purposes. Alternatively, we can justify the 
assumption of increasing benefit by assuming that research entities 
themselves will screen out projects that are of great difficulty and little 
value so that we need not consider them in our model. 
 
16 It is probably possible to imagine situations in which these plausible 
assumptions would not hold. We exclude such exceptional and, we think, rare 
situations from our analysis. 
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Figure 1 thus displays plausible expected cost and expected private value 
curves for an inventive firm. In this Article, we mostly assume that y is a 
continuous variable—i.e., that there is a continuum of increasingly difficult 
projects. In some cases, it will be more appropriate to think of y as an ordinal 
variable, ordering projects by technical difficulty. We do not believe this 
distinction is of great significance for our primary results and conclusions, 
but we recognize that it may have some consequences and will consider them 
in our more detailed treatment. Though there is no quantitative scale for 
technical difficulty, we believe that there is an intuitive scale of difficulty 
approximately shared by PHOSITA in a given field and that on this intuitive 
scale, marginal costs tend to increase with technical difficulty as depicted in 
Figure 1.17 The curvature of the value curve shown in the figure reflects the 
expectation that there are decreasing returns to technological improvement. 
We also assume that the expected private value of an invention is increased 
by patenting and thus that v(y) < V(y). There are undoubtedly situations in 
which this is not the case—a researcher who expects to be able to exploit an 
invention secretly for longer than the patent term might well expect private 
value to be decreased by patenting. In such situations, the nonobviousness 
threshold is irrelevant, since researchers will eschew patent protection. We 
thus set these situations aside for the present analysis. 
 
17 Alternatively, and without loss of generality here, we could scale the horizontal 
axis to cost and draw a linear cost curve. The linear cost curve assumption breaks 
down if we want to compare different cost curves for the same set of research 
projects—for example if we want to model different classes of potential inventors. We 
do this in our more detailed treatment, but it is not necessary for the present Article. 
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Given the private costs and benefits of available projects, as illustrated in 
Figure 1, one can determine the optimal choice of research project by 
maximizing net private return. If the firm does not plan to patent (or if no 
patent is available), then the project that maximizes expected profit is yn. If 
the firm does plan to patent, then the profit-maximizing project is yp. These 
choices maximize the difference between expected private value and 
expected cost.18 Because a patent increases private returns from each given 
invention, the optimal project if a patent is available (denoted yp in Figure 1) 
is at a higher level of technical difficulty than the optimal project if no patent 
is available (denoted yn in Figure 1), as illustrated by the fact that yp is to the 
right of yn in the figure. This observation is consistent with the general idea 
that a patent provides an “incentive” for invention, but it is a somewhat more 
subtle interpretation than the simple idea that a patent allows an inventor to 
recoup her investments in inventive activity. 
In Parts III, IV, and V, we will build upon this basic model to address the 
issues of the function of the nonobviousness threshold, the reasons for 
treating nonobviousness as a question of law, and the need for a patentable 
subject matter restriction. Before doing so, we pause to compare the model 
we have just introduced with earlier attempts to model the nonobviousness 
issue. 
B. Comparison of the Model to the Previous Literature 
Even though most commentators identify the nonobviousness doctrine 
as the most important standard for obtaining a patent, there is surprisingly 
little formal analysis of the standard by either lawyers or economists.19 Most 
discussions of the issue revolve around attempting to distinguish those 
inventions that would have been made even without the patent incentive—
because first-mover advantages and other non-patent rewards for invention 
 
18 See Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 4, at 852 (drawing lessons from the 
work of Nelson and Winter: firms emphasize business factors including expected cost 
and value and not just technical difficulty when they invest in R&D); Merges, 
Uncertainty, supra note 4, at 10–11 (the prospect of getting a patent likely affects 
research project choice). 
19 See references cited, supra note 4, for earlier commentary on the issue of 
nonobviousness. Some of the work on cumulative innovation by economists also can 
be applied to the nonobviousness requirement. Robert Hunt has done this explicitly. 
He shows that weakening the nonobviousness requirement raises the expected value 
of patenting and provides an incentive to firms to do more research, but it also 
increases patenting by others. The patenting of others will hurt the research incentive 
of pioneers when subsequent patents cover improvements of or complements to the 
technology covered by the pioneer’s patent. See Robert M. Hunt, Nonobviousness and 
the Incentive to Innovate: An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Reform 38 (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 99-3, 1999), available at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/files/wps/1999/wp99-3.pdf (showing “that weaker 
nonobviousness requirements can lead to less R&D activity, and this is more likely to 
occur in industries that rapidly innovate”); Robert M. Hunt, Patentability, Industry 
Structure, and Innovation, 52 J. INDUS. ECON. 401, 402 (2004). We will discuss 
cumulative innovation in our longer article, Nonobviousness and Nerd Culture, supra 
note 10. 
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provide sufficient excess returns to cover inventive costs—from those that 
need a patent to garner sufficient returns.20 The question is usually framed in 
terms of whether it is possible for an inventor to recoup her investments in 
invention without a patent or whether a patent is required to make a profit. 
From this dichotomous perspective, commentators often argue that an 
optimal choice of patentability standard should minimize error costs.21 One 
type of error, called a false positive, occurs when the patent incentive is not 
needed to induce the invention, yet a patent is granted. In such cases, society 
needlessly bears the cost of a patent. The other sort of error, called a false 
negative, occurs when a patent is not available for an inventive project that 
will not be profitable without the additional private return which patent 
exclusivity would provide. Under these analyses, a more rigorous obviousness 
standard increases false negatives and reduces false positives. An optimal 
policy finds the right balance. Though this approach is useful in advancing 
our general understanding of alternative means for inventors to recoup 
inventive investments, the “on/off” picture of invention is unrealistic and has 
so far been unsuccessful in leading to doctrinal tools for setting the 
nonobviousness threshold. 
Our model differs from these informal discussions of the law and 
economics of obviousness by assuming that research managers choose 
among possible research projects of varying technical difficulty rather than 
making a simple yes or no choice—conduct research or not in pursuit of a 
particular invention. In the analysis that follows here and in our more 
detailed article, we consider how those research manager choices relate to 
socially preferable research choices. 
Two earlier approaches to the nonobviousness issue bear a closer 
relationship to ours and it is worth describing them in a bit more detail here 
for purposes of comparison. Professor Robert Merges has proposed and 
analyzed a model which, like ours, is inspired by the conception of a research 
manager determining how to invest in research and development.22 Like our 
model, Merges’s model goes beyond a simple dichotomous choice to invent 
or not invent based on whether a positive net private return is expected ex 
ante. He presents a two-stage model featuring a decision to conduct research 
in stage one and a decision to develop the resulting technology in stage 
two.23 In Merges’s model, uncertainty plays the primary role.24 The first stage 
of research reduces the uncertainty associated with the decision to pursue 
the second stage of development. Merges uses his model to argue that, 
because of the important role played by uncertainty, adjustments of the 
obviousness standard are not likely to change the expected value of a 
research project significantly.25 Nonetheless, Merges emphasizes, like we do, 
 
20 See, e.g., Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 4, at 29–31; Kitch, supra note 4, at 301. 
21 See, e.g., Cotropia, Patent Law, supra note 4, at 1563–67. 
22 See generally Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 4 (analyzing the effect of 
nonobviousness on business judgments by R&D managers). 
23 Id. at 21–23. 
24 Id. at 23–26, 31. 
25 Id. at 25–26. 
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that the obviousness standard is still important to give the right incentives to 
guide investment of the marginal research dollar.26 He argues that the 
probability of technical success should be the key to implementing the 
nonobviousness requirement, both because it is so important for 
determining whether a project will be undertaken and because it is a 
relatively feasible standard to implement.27 Research projects that are 
sufficiently likely to succeed should not yield patents because such projects 
are likely to go forward without the prospect of a patent. By denying patents 
in such cases, society avoids the social costs patents impose. In contrast, 
uncertain projects, especially when the cost of research is high, should satisfy 
the obviousness standard because the patent incentive is probably needed as 
an incentive to invent.28 
Merges’s model incorporates a more sophisticated view of the way in 
which a given research project progresses than is featured either in more 
informal discussions of obviousness or in our model, which does not break 
the research project down into stages (though it does account for the overall 
uncertainty of a research project). Despite its sophistication, however, 
Merges’s model retains the focus on a single, given, research project.29 Our 
model broadens the view of the function of the obviousness requirement to 
include its possible influence on the choice of various possible research 
directions. 
Though lacking the detailed treatment of uncertainty reduction that is 
present in Merges’s model, our model incorporates uncertainty to some 
degree by focusing on expected costs and benefits. We assume that inventive 
costs rise for projects of great technical difficulty. This rise is attributable in 
significant part to the increased uncertainty of such projects.30 
Professor Glynn Lunney has proposed an approach to nonobviousness 
which is similar to ours in that it compares incentives to invest in various 
possible projects.31 Where our model focuses on a research manager’s choice 
among research projects, Lunney’s analysis focuses on the choice between 
inventive and non-inventive investments.32 He argues that what he terms the 
“creative investment fraction” affects the availability of innovation rents 
(based on first-mover advantages and so forth) where patent protection is 
 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 2–3, 29–32, 35–37 (uncertainty based theory of nonobviousness). 
28 Id. at 41–55 (favoring patents when there is high variance of research cost 
coupled with risk aversion). 
29 Id. at 19–20. Merges does note in passing the potential for a patenting 
threshold based on riskiness of research to displace lower-risk research, id. at 20–21, 
but the selection between research projects is not a focus of his analysis. 
30 Merges also discusses the implications of risk aversion, particularly for high 
cost research projects. Id. at 43–55. Our model does not deal with risk aversion 
explicitly, but our assumption that there are diminishing marginal returns to 
inventors as technical step increases is consistent with risk aversion (though 
motivated more by an assumption that technical improvements generally do produce 
diminishing marginal improvements in the social and private value of inventions). 
31 Lunney, supra note 4. 
32 Id. at 404–12. 
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unavailable.33 The “creative investment fraction” is the fraction of the overall 
investment in a project which is spent on presumably easy-to-copy invention, 
as opposed to things like materials and capital equipment. The “creative 
investment fraction” thus reflects the degree to which a second-comer can 
produce a product more cheaply than the inventor.34 In other words, it is a 
measure of the extent of possible free riding. Lunney advocates setting a 
threshold of creative investment fraction for awarding a patent.35 
A key insight of Lunney’s article is that the nonobviousness threshold 
may be used to shift investment between projects. Lunney argues that free 
riding can decrease the private rents available from high-creativity projects, 
thus drawing investment to lower-creativity projects even if the high-creativity 
projects have higher social value. The nonobviousness threshold is used in 
his proposal to award patents on high-creativity projects so as to deter free 
riding and shift investment toward those projects. 
Our model assumes a research manager who chooses only among 
creative projects. However, the creative investment fraction for a given 
research project is reflected in our model in the ratio between V(y) and v(y). 
A project with a high creative investment fraction (and corresponding high 
potential for free riding) will have a high ratio of V(y)/v(y). Conversely, a 
project with a low creative investment fraction (and correspondingly greater 
first mover advantage) will have a ratio of V(y)/v(y) closer to one. If, for 
example, we were to assume that the costs of producing light bulbs are 
relatively insensitive to the choice of filament material, then a graph like 
Figure 1 for the light bulb project would show an increasing proportional 
separation between V(y) and v(y) as y increased. The result of such an 
increasing “creative investment fraction” would be reflected in our model in 
a larger separation between yn and yp. 
As discussed in the next Part, our model departs from both Lunney’s 
and Merges’s in the way it accounts for the social value of invention. Our 
model suggests that neither a fixed threshold based on creative investment 
fraction nor a fixed uncertainty threshold sufficiently accounts for the 
divergence between socially and privately optimal choice of research 
projects. 
III. THE CARROT AND STICK OF THE NONOBVIOUSNESS 
THRESHOLD 
A. The Patent Carrot 
Up to this point, we have said nothing about the role of the 
nonobviousness threshold in motivating the choice of research project in our 
model. Figure 1 shows how patenting provides a carrot to induce researchers 
to pursue more difficult projects, but a nonobviousness threshold apparently 
is not needed to induce this higher level of activity. To understand the role 
 
33 Id. at 413–15. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 415–18. 
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of the nonobviousness requirement, we must consider the social welfare 
implications of the project choices researchers make. What is the 
relationship between the privately optimal research project and the socially 
preferable choice? To answer this question, we must consider the likely 
relationship between private and social value of the research. Figure 2 
illustrates a highly stylized situation in which a patent provides perfect 
appropriation of the value of the invention. In that case, the expected social 
value of project y, which we denote W(y), equals the expected private  
value with a patent, V(y). We also assume in Figure 2 that the  
social and private costs are equal. In the simple case depicted in  
Figure 2 the socially optimal project, which we call y*, would match the  
privately optimal project when the inventor pursues a patent, yp. 
Meurer Strandburg 












Figure 2 provides a helpful benchmark that we use to make three 
preliminary points. First, there is a socially optimal level of technical 
improvement. More is not always better. Society could get positive expected 
returns from any project up to y*, but it would be socially wasteful to push for 
difficult projects to the right of y*, because the cost of those projects rises 
more quickly than the benefit. Thus, the goal of patent law (and the 
nonobviousness requirement more specifically) should not be to encourage 
greater levels of invention per se, but to encourage the socially preferable 
level of invention. In Figure 2, the socially preferable level is the same as the 
privately preferable level because we assume that the patentee captures all 
the benefits of the invention. Realistically, the expected social and private 
values are likely to diverge. They coincide only if the inventor captures all the 
value of the invention, and if the patent does not impose any social cost in 
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excess of the costs invested directly in research and development. As we 
discuss in greater detail later, most of the time, the socially optimal research 
project will be more ambitious than the private optimum because of 
spillovers in value, but sometimes it may be lower than the private optimum 
in the presence of patenting because of the social costs patenting imposes. 
Second, the optimal choice of a nonobviousness standard is inextricably 
linked to spillovers and patenting costs. When the assumptions underlying 
Figure 2 hold true, there is no need for a nonobviousness requirement and 
patenting would always be optimal because private parties would choose the 
socially (and privately) optimal level of invention even if patents were 
available at lesser levels of technical improvement. Third, our model reminds 
us that the frequent crude assumption that an invention will be pursued as 
long as private benefits outweigh private costs is unlikely to pertain to 
realistic inventive scenarios where researchers seek to maximize net returns. 
B. The Nonobviousness Stick 
In this Section, we relax the assumption of no spillovers illustrated in 
Figure 2. We then explain why spillovers create a role for a nonobviousness 
standard. Figure 3 displays a setting in which the expected social benefit 
generally exceeds the expected private benefit of a research project, i.e., W(y) 
> V(y). For simplicity of analysis, we interpret W(y) to represent the net social 
benefit over and above the direct costs of the research project (which we 
have previously denoted c(y) rather than displaying a separate social cost 
curve.36 Private and social benefits generally diverge for several reasons.37 
Probably the two most important are (1) that a patent owner does not 
capture all the value enjoyed by users of his or her invention,38 and (2) that 
disclosure of an invention, including the disclosure in the patent, helps 
others develop subsequent inventions.39 
 
36 This assumption is important in interpreting our later graphs, in which we 
allow the possibility that social value depends on whether the invention is patented. 
37 For a discussion of the ubiquity and importance of spillovers of intellectual 
property, see Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
257 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1031 (2005). See also JAMES BESSEN AND MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (Princeton University 
Press 2008) (discussing why patents fail to work effectively as property rights). 
38 Consumer surplus is the term economists apply to the value enjoyed by 
consumers. Normally, patentees lack the information and the market power required 
to extract all consumer surplus. For a discussion of price discrimination and 
consumer surplus extraction by patent holders, see generally Jerry A. Hausman & 
Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Price Discrimination and Patent Policy, 19 RAND J. Econ. 253 
(1988); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001). 
39 Patent rights are limited in important ways so that subsequent improvers can 
earn rents from their improvements, and thus, they have an incentive to pursue 
improvement innovations. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the 
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, 
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Normally, the divergence of social and private value implies the 
divergence of the socially optimal project from the privately optimal project. 
Figure 3 shows that, at least for cost and benefit curves of the generally 
reasonable shape depicted,40 the technical advance corresponding to the 
socially optimal project, y*, exceeds that of the privately optimal project, yp, 
even when the inventor pursues a patent. Intuitively, a social planner wants 
to push for a more difficult project because the marginal social gains at yp are 
large enough to more than offset the marginal cost of a project at level yp 
even though the marginal private gains are not. The divergence between yp 
and y* is due to the assumption, reflected in Figure 3, that the greater the 
technical advance, the more the social value associated with that advance 
exceeds the private value. This assumption reflects the reasonable notion 
that bigger inventive steps are likely to lead to more extensive and broader 
opportunities for follow-on innovation and, in particular, that they are more 
likely to lead to a broader and more extensive set of improvements that will 
not be made by the original inventor. 
One new insight from our model is that it is to a great extent because of 
this gap between privately and socially optimal invention levels that a 
nonobviousness threshold is desirable. The obviousness standard can be used 
as a stick to prod an inventive entity to choose a more difficult research 
project than is privately optimal. We let O represent the threshold level of 
difficulty that must be met or surpassed before a firm can get a patent. If O is 
set at any value less than or equal to yp, then it is not binding, in the sense 
that it does not push the research entity to choose a more difficult project 
than it would otherwise choose. On the other hand, if O is greater than yp, it 
is binding in the sense that if an inventive entity wants a patent, it must 
choose a project that is more difficult than it would have chosen in a regime 
with no obviousness standard (or a lax standard). 
 
INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004) (discussing the ways in which patent law balances 
incentives for original and follow-on inventors). 
40 It is possible to imagine scenarios in which social and private value are not 
related as depicted here. For example, private and social values could approach one 
another in such a way that the socially optimum research project is less of an 
inventive step than the privately optimal step. Depending on the specifics, it may be 
optimal in such cases to refrain from patenting altogether. We address this question 
in more detail in our longer article, but for now we simply state that we believe that in 
most cases social spillovers will increase with the size of the technological advance. 
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In Figure 3, the socially optimal choice of O simply equals the value of y 
that maximizes the difference between expected social value and cost, y*. 
Figure 3 thus illustrates how patents can function as both a “carrot” and a 
“stick” in stimulating invention. Patents virtually always act as a carrot to 
stimulate the choice of more difficult research projects. Even without an 
obviousness test, a patent creates an incentive that induces the firm to 
choose yp rather than yn. The nonobviousness requirement, however, can 
provide a stick to push inventors to choose even more ambitious, socially 
preferable projects. Thus, Figure 3 shows that the effect of a patent system 
with an obviousness standard of O can be decomposed into a carrot effect 
and a stick effect. The sum of these two effects raises the choice of research 
project from yn to y
*. 
The view of the nonobviousness threshold suggested by our model is 
significantly different from the perspective suggested by the usual discussion 
based on the “on/off” view. The usual discussion has two parts: First, it 
assumes that inventions are produced as long as they produce a net profit for 
the inventor. In terms of our model this would mean that inventions are 
produced without the patent incentive as long as v(y) – c(y) > 0. Second, it 
posits that the purpose of the nonobviousness threshold is to avoid awarding 
patents to inventions that would be produced even without the patent 
incentive. If we consider this simplistic view in the context of Figure 3, we see 
that it leads to a contradictory analysis. The assumption that projects are 
pursued as long as there is a nonzero net return would suggest setting the 
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obviousness threshold quite high—at the point where v(y) and c(y) cross. 
Importantly, this point is above the socially optimal value of y. Moreover, our 
model suggests that if the obviousness threshold were in fact set that high, 
rather than choosing to pursue such a large inventive step our research 
manager would choose the privately optimal project, yn. Thus, a 
nonobviousness threshold set at the point where v(y) – c(y) = 0 would 
backfire, leaving us without the benefits of the patent incentive carrot. On 
the other hand, if we take the second part of the usual analysis seriously—
that the nonobviousness threshold should be set just so as to avoid patenting 
those inventions that would be produced without a patent incentive—the 
implication would seem to be that we should set the nonobviousness 
threshold at yn. A nonobviousness threshold at yn, however, would fail to 
provide a “stick” to push our researcher toward the socially preferred choice. 
Indeed, setting the nonobviousness threshold at yn has no impact on the 
research manager’s choice to pursue the yp research project. Our model 
provides a more reasonable understanding of where the nonobviousness 
threshold should be set. 
Figure 3 also illustrates another of the misleading aspects of the crude 
“on/off” view of the incentive effects of patenting. If the nonobviousness 
threshold is mistakenly set too high, the result is not that invention is 
foregone, but that non-optimal and inefficiently difficult projects will have to 
be undertaken to obtain a patent. This is a social cost, of course, but not the 
cost that (and probably not as great a cost as) the simpler perspective 
suggests. 
While it is desirable to set the nonobviousness threshold at the social 
optimum, even a perfectly informed social planner faces a constraint when 
using the obviousness standard as a stick. Prospective inventors will choose 
not to pursue patentable projects if the nonobviousness threshold is set so 
high that it is privately preferable to pursue a lower-tech unpatentable 
project. We will call this the patenting constraint. The obviousness standard 
can be used to prod an inventor to choose the socially optimal research 
project only as long as that research project is at least as profitable (given a 
patent) as the profit available from the research project, yn, that the inventor 
would choose in the absence of a patent. As a policy matter, this means that 
in some cases involving relatively large social spillovers, other mechanisms 
(such as direct government funding of research) may be needed to obtain 
the socially optimal level of research. 
In Figure 3, the patenting constraint does not impede full use of the 
obviousness standard as a stick. By inspection one can see that the private 
profit available with a patent at y* exceeds the private profit available without 
a patent at yn. Thus O can be set at the socially optimal level, y
*, that 
maximizes W(y) – c(y). The patenting constraint binds in the example 
displayed in Figure 4, however. In Figure 4, the obviousness standard O 
should be less than y* because the profit at y* is too small to induce a research 
manager to pursue a patentable invention. The vertical distance AB 
measures the maximum expected profit if the firm chooses not to patent. 
That distance is larger than GH, the expected profit given a patent and the 
choice of y = y*. One can see from Figure 4 that the patenting constraint is 
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likely to be important when the social benefit from an invention is 
considerably greater than the private benefit captured by patenting, so that y* 
greatly exceeds yp. 
Meurer Strandburg 



















Even when the patenting constraint binds, as in Figure 4, the 
obviousness standard can still be used as a stick to prod an inventive entity to 
choose a more difficult project than it would otherwise choose. The socially 
optimal choice of O in such a case, illustrated in Figure 4, is that value of y at 
which the expected profit, measured by DE, equals the expected profit, AB,41 
which an inventor expects to receive by pursuing the privately optimal 
unpatentable project at yn. Though social welfare would be increased even 
more by a project of difficulty y*, the patent system cannot induce 
investment in a project at that level. 
The patenting constraint has the following policy relevance: If the 
constraint binds tightly, then the obviousness standard cannot be used to 
push up the difficulty of research projects very much. In such cases, a 
rigorous obviousness standard can be counterproductive. If it is mistakenly 
set too high, then inventive entities will forego pursuing patentable 
inventions and the project difficulty will fall to yn. The risk of this error is apt 
to grow as the patenting constraint binds more tightly. 
 
41 There is no harm in assuming that the firm will choose to patent when 
patenting and not patenting are equally profitable. 
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To summarize, our model gives us the following advice as to where the 
nonobviousness threshold should be set: if possible, set O at the socially 
optimal technical level, y*. If the patenting constraint binds, set O at the 
highest feasible technical level, as illustrated in Figure 4. Of course, this 
result does not give us a recipe for assessing obviousness in the real world, 
where we do not know how to draw the curves shown in Figures 3 and 4. 
What it does is help us to understand the goal of the nonobviousness 
requirement and give us an idea of the factors we should consider in 
constructing a practical approach to the nonobviousness question. It is, for 
example, important to understand how research costs rise as the technical 
approaches to a particular objective increase in difficulty. Many of the factual 
inquiries laid out by the Supreme Court in Graham42 and KSR43—such as the 
inquiry into the level of ordinary skill in the art and the secondary 
consideration of “long-felt need”—can be viewed as means to probe the 
shape of the cost curve, and we argue elsewhere that there are other factors 
that should also be included.44 
The model also sheds light, for example, on the puzzle of how the “level 
of ordinary skill in the art” is connected to the ultimate assessment of 
nonobviousness. A naïve approach might conclude that the higher the level 
of skill in a particular art, the more obvious new inventions are likely to be. 
Such an approach seems to call for a higher nonobviousness threshold in 
more skilled fields—thus suggesting, counterintuitively, that the obviousness 
threshold should be “higher” in biotechnology than for simple mechanical 
inventions. Our model illustrates why such an approach makes no sense. 
What matters for nonobviousness is not the level of ordinary skill in one art 
compared to the level of ordinary skill in another, but the level of ordinary 
skill in a particular art with respect to the technical difficulty of the problems 
in that art. The latter determines the rate at which costs increase with 
technical difficulty. 
Besides drawing our attention to the shape of the cost curve, the model 
also informs the analysis of how to perform the ultimate assessment of 
obviousness, which should not be viewed as a merely technical assessment, 
but must be made in light of an understanding of social spillovers. We turn 
to the ramifications of this observation in the next Part of this Article. 
IV. OBVIOUSNESS AS A QUESTION OF LAW 
It is settled law that the ultimate determination of obviousness is a 
question of law with factual underpinnings. As the Supreme Court put it 
in its seminal Graham opinion: 
 
42 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
43 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740–43 (2007). 
44 MEURER AND STRANDBURG, supra note 10. For an earlier discussion of the 
importance of taking into account factors such as regulatory and technical change, 
see, e.g., Duffy, supra note 4, at 11–14. See also Wagner & Strandburg, supra note 4, at 
104. 
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While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, the §103 
condition, which is but one of three conditions, each of which must 
be satisfied, lends itself to several basic factual inquiries. Under 
§ 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; 
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be 
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art 
resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or 
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such 
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but 
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light 
to the circumstance surrounding the origin of the subject matter 
sought to be patented.45 
Despite the clear and oft-repeated understanding that obviousness is a 
question of law, neither the significance of the legal aspect of the issue, nor 
the way in which the factual underpinnings should be related to the ultimate 
legal assessment is at all well understood. Indeed, there has been a tendency 
to transmute obviousness into an effective question of fact while paying lip 
service to its status as a legal issue. 
Historically, the status of nonobviousness as a question of fact or law was 
disputed. Case law prior to the enactment of the 1952 Act frequently treated 
the issue of “invention” (the precursor to modern-day “nonobviousness”) as a 
question of fact.46 To this day, the question is frequently decided by a jury—
with or without special interrogatories as to the underlying factual 
premises.47 Even more tellingly, the Federal Circuit’s repeated invocations of 
the “question of law” mantra in its obviousness jurisprudence were belied by 
its actual approach to the obviousness issue. Until the Supreme Court’s 
recent rejection of the Federal Circuit’s rigid approach to obviousness, the 
Federal Circuit had held that no patent claim could be ruled obvious without 
an evidentiary, factual finding48 of a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation to 
combine” (TSM) prior art references to produce the claimed advance.49 
Because such a factual finding was a prerequisite of a conclusion that an 
invention was obvious, the factual inquiry quite literally swallowed the 
potential for “legal” analysis where no such teaching was found since the only 
acceptable legal conclusion under those circumstances was that the 
 
45 383 U.S. at 17 –18 (citations omitted). 
46 See, e.g., 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS , § 5.04[3] (2007). 
47 See, e.g., Federal Circuit Bar Association Model Patent Jury Instructions  
4.3b et seq., available at http://www.memberconnections.com/olc/pub/LVFC/ 
cpages/misc/purchase_resources.jsp; Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Model Patent 
Jury Instructions § 7.0 (2005), available at http://www.aipla.org/Template.cfm? 
ContentID=10448&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm. 
48 See, e.g., Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he presence or absence of a motivation to combine references in an obviousness 
determination is a pure question of fact[.]” (quoting In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000))). 
49 See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734–35 (describing the 
Federal Circuit’s test). In the more unusual case of a single prior art reference, the 
Federal Circuit required a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to “modify” it. See, e.g., 
McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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invention was nonobvious. In practice, the TSM test also effectively swallowed 
the legal inquiry in cases where there was such a teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation to combine, since a conclusion of nonobviousness in such a case 
was also extremely rare.50 
In light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in KSR, which unseated the 
Federal Circuit’s rigid requirement of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation 
to combine as a prerequisite to a legal conclusion of obviousness and 
mandated a return to the Graham framework, the question of what it means 
for obviousness to be a question of law is now open and an answer to this 
question is urgently needed as part of a re-thinking of the nonobviousness 
requirement more generally. To further complicate matters, the doctrine of 
obviousness as a question of law was developed before the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Dickinson v. Zurko brought judicial review of the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) into the standard administrative law 
fold.51 Once the Federal Circuit’s TSM short-circuit of the legal question of 
obviousness is abandoned, the Graham framework raises difficult questions 
not only about the relationship between the Federal Circuit and the lower 
courts, but also about the relationship between the Federal Circuit and the 
USPTO with respect to judicial review of obviousness determinations. 
Here, we do not attempt to address those potentially thorny 
administrative law issues. Rather, we seek to contribute to the development 
of nonobviousness doctrine by asking the more fundamental question of why 
the nonobviousness determination should be deemed a question of law as a 
policy matter. The line between questions of law and questions of fact crops 
up in many contexts, of course, and is generally a somewhat perplexing issue 
to which various approaches are possible.52 One approach, which we adopt 
here, is to treat the question of whether an issue should be treated as a 
question of law or fact as a practical question of institutional competence.53 
 
50 We surveyed Federal Circuit cases between 1995–2006 and found that in 44 
out of 45 cases in which a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine was found, 
the invention was deemed obvious. 
51 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. 
Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn From Administrative Law, 
95 GEO. L. J. 269, 270–71 (2007). 
52 See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing & Rationalizing the 
Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 649 (1988) (standards of 
review serve to allocate responsibility between trial tribunals and the courts of 
appeals); Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American 
Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (1999); Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of 
Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L. J. 1 (1985); Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up 
About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101 (2005); Ronald J. Allen & Michael 
S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 1769 (2003). 
53 As the Supreme Court said in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 
370, 388 (1996): 
Where history and precedent provide no clear answers, functional 
considerations also play their part in the choice between judge and jury to 
define terms of art. We said in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985), that 
when an issue ‘falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a 
simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a 
LCB_12_2_ART10_STRANDBURG.DOC 5/22/2008 4:30:04 PM 
568 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:2 
We thus frame the question in this way: Who is better suited to make the 
determinations required to decide whether a patent should be granted on a 
particular invention, factfinders or judges?54 Factfinders are conversant with 
the evidence in a particular case and have had the opportunity to hear 
witnesses and assess their credibility. Judges, on the other hand, are 
conversant with the interpretation of statutory language and are able to take 
a broader, policy-based view of the possible ramifications of particular 
outcomes in particular cases. 
While the line between questions of law and questions of fact is difficult 
to draw in many contexts, it may be particularly difficult to draw in the 
patent arena because of the importance not only of the kind of case-specific 
facts relevant to questions such as negligence and of over-arching policy 
issues of the kind common law judges routinely take into account, but also of 
highly technical matters which are to be gauged from the perspective of the 
PHOSITA. 
Thus, we turn here first to the question of whether difficult 
technological inquiries are appropriately treated as questions of law or of 
fact. Despite their complexity and difficulty, questions of technology are 
generally treated as questions of fact in patent law, presumably because of 
the lower court’s greater access to expert and documentary evidence and to 
the development of technological issues throughout the course of a trial. 
Certainly, putting aside the litigation context for a moment, patent 
examiners would seem to be better positioned than judges to deal with 
technological questions and it would seem reasonable to afford their 
technological assessments the kind of deference afforded to agency factual 
determinations according to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dickinson v. 
Zurko.55 
Many issues in patent law involving the assessment of technological 
matters similar to those underlying the obviousness determination are 
 
determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one 
judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in 
question.’ 
(internal citations omitted). 
54 Here we oversimplify by considering, for the most part, the determination of 
validity in the context of a lawsuit where the rules of factfinder and judge are clear 
(even though they may be played in some cases by the same district court judge). Of 
course, most determinations of obviousness are made by the USPTO, an 
administrative agency. Agencies often act in both factfinding and legal capacities. The 
PTO’s position is particularly complicated because it does not have substantive 
rulemaking capacity. We wish to avoid here the complexities of determining, for 
example, what form of deference would be appropriate for the Federal Circuit to give 
to a PTO determination of a question of law. We think the higher-level matter of 
whether, and in what sense, obviousness is a question of law can be resolved without 
getting into these admittedly important questions, simply by analyzing whether the 
obviousness inquiry is more appropriately addressed to an actor playing the 
factfinding role or an actor playing the legal role. For simplicity, we thus speak of 
juries and judges while recognizing that the factfinding and legal evaluation tasks are 
both performed in the first instance by a PTO examiner. 
55 Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 164. 
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treated as factual inquiries. Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, 
for example, is a question of fact, despite requiring a determination of 
whether a PHOSITA would have deemed an element of an allegedly 
infringing invention to be interchangeable with a claim limitation.56 Novelty, 
which requires a comparison of a claimed invention to an allegedly 
infringing embodiment, is also treated as a factual question.57 The written 
description requirement is also deemed a question of fact.58 
Exceptions from this general treatment of technology-based questions as 
fact questions provide additional insight. The existence of a statutory bar 
under section 102(b), for example, is considered a question of law.59 At first 
glance, this is surprising in light of the fact that much of the art available to 
challenge validity under 102(b) is of the same ilk as that available under 
102(a)’s novelty provision. However, upon further reflection it is clear that 
102(b) is the locus of significant policy balancing. To the chagrin of 
generations of patent law students (and with not a shred of statutory 
justification), 102(b) analysis treats trade secret use of an invention prior to 
filing differently depending on whether it is used by the inventor or by a 
third party.60 This distinction results in a complicated analysis that reflects a 
juggling of various patent law policies involving not removing things from 
the public domain, protecting the interests of smaller inventors, and 
forestalling gamesmanship aimed at extending effective patent life. The 
presence of these policy issues makes it sensible to treat 102(b) as a question 
of law. 
Enablement, which requires determining whether a PHOSITA would be 
enabled to make and use an invention without undue experimentation by 
reading the specification, is deemed a question of law by the Federal Circuit, 
though it was treated as a question of fact by some earlier courts.61 Like 
obviousness, it is determined on the basis of underlying questions of fact.62 
The factual considerations are technical questions akin to those underlying 
the obviousness determination: 
They include (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the 
amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or 
absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) 
the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) 
 
56 See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521 
(Fed. Cir. 1995). 
57 See, e.g., Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (“Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 requires the disclosure in a single piece 
of prior art of each and every limitation of a claimed invention. Whether such art is 
anticipating is a question of fact.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
58 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 7.04[f] (2007). 
59 See, e.g., Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
60 Compare, e.g., Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 
F.2d 516, 520 (2d. Cir. 1946) with W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc. 721 F.2d 
1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
61 See CHISUM, supra note 58, at § 7.03[b][i] for a discussion of the history of the 
treatment of enablement as a question of law. 
62 See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth 
of the claims.63 
The ultimate question of enablement is a policy assessment of whether 
the disclosure is sufficient to warrant the quid pro quo of a patent or 
whether the PHOSITA must engage in “undue experimentation.” The 
amount of experimentation required is thus a technical question which is 
determined by factfinders, but it is a policy matter whether the 
experimentation required is “undue.” 
Claim construction might seem like an exception to the general 
treatment of technological questions as questions of fact.64 However, it is 
treated as a question of law not because of its technical complexity but 
because of presumed judicial expertise in construing written documents, 
despite its involving technical understanding of those documents. In holding 
in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. that claim construction is a question 
for the judge, the Supreme Court did not delve into the question of who is 
better situated to deal with complicated technology, resting its decision on 
the judge’s generally superior ability to construe documents and on the need 
for uniformity in claim construction determinations.65 However, the Federal 
Circuit’s later interpretation of the Markman ruling as authorizing de novo 
review of claim construction rulings66 has been extremely controversial, even 
among Federal Circuit judges.67 Critics of the Federal Circuit’s current 
position argue that district judges who have heard the evidence and expert 
testimony on the technical questions underlying claim construction are 
better positioned to make the underlying technological determinations 
relevant to claim construction and should be afforded deference as to those 
underlying issues. 
In most instances, then, courts have come to the conclusion that 
factfinders, who have the opportunity to hear extensive testimony, often by 
experts, and to peruse relevant technical references, are more competent 
than appellate judges at coming to grips with the technological aspects of 
patent law. The treatment of inquiries into the state of technology as 
questions of fact is reflected in the Supreme Court’s framework for the 
obviousness inquiry, which treats “the scope and content of the prior art,” 
 
63 Id. 
64 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (claim 
construction is a question for the judge; there is no right to a jury determination); 
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (claim 
construction is reviewed by the Federal Circuit de novo). 
65 Markman, 517 U.S. at 388–91. 
66 Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1451. 
67 See, e.g., Id. at 1463 (Bryson, J. , concurring); Id. at 1463–66 (Mayer, J., 
concurring); Id. at 1473–81 (Rader, J., dissenting in part); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 
F.3d 1303, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer, J. dissenting) (arguing that, 
under the Cybor de novo review standard, “with a blind eye to the consequences, we 
continue to struggle under this irrational and reckless regime, trying every 
alternative—dictionaries first, dictionaries second, never dictionaries, etc., etc., etc.” 
and that “there can be no workable standards by which this court will interpret claims 
so long as we are blind to the factual component of the task.”). 
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“differences between the claimed invention and the prior art” and “the level 
of skill in the art” as factual questions. 
If factfinders are considered most competent to determine technical 
questions, then in what sense is obviousness a question of law? Here our 
model provides important insight. Previous treatment of the nonobviousness 
requirement has obscured the non-technological policy questions it involves. 
In one view, the assessment of nonobviousness is almost exclusively 
technological. This view, which we might call the technical view of 
nonobviousness, seems to underlie the Federal Circuit’s TSM test. In this 
view, the aim of the nonobviousness inquiry is solely to determine whether, 
at the time of the invention, if one had presented a representative sample of 
persons having ordinary skill in the art with the problem addressed by the 
invention and asked them, “How would you solve this question?”, some 
reasonable proportion of them would have responded by describing the 
claimed invention.68 There are practical difficulties, most notably the 
hindsight bias,69 in getting the right answer to this question in retrospect, but 
on this view of nonobviousness, there is only a technical question to be 
answered. 
The technical view of nonobviousness gives us no particular reason to 
treat obviousness as a question of law. Cases such as Markman also do not 
justify treating obviousness as a question of law. The underpinnings of the 
determination that claim construction is a question of law despite its 
technical content do not really apply to the nonobviousness determination. 
Obviousness assessment does not revolve around the interpretation of legal 
documents, nor is there the strong interest in uniformity that exists in claim 
construction. Once a claim is rejected by the patent office and the rejection 
affirmed on appeal, it is no longer going to be assessed (uniformly or 
otherwise) by any other tribunal. Moreover, invalidity determinations in 
litigation are subject to collateral estoppel, so they are also unlikely to be 
presented to more than one court.70 It is thus not surprising that those 
holding the technical view of nonobviousness would inevitably slide toward 
treating nonobviousness as a question of fact, even if giving lip service to the 
Supreme Court’s requirement that nonobviousness be treated as a question 
of law. 
A second view, popular among commentators, which we might call the 
contextual view of nonobviousness, is that the normative goal of the 
nonobviousness doctrine is to refrain from patenting anything that would be 
invented without a patent incentive.71 Implicit in this view is the assumption, 
discussed in more detail in Part V, that patenting a particular invention 
decreases its social value, so that if it would be invented (or perhaps invented 
 
68 This view is reflected in the experiments reported by Mandel, Patently Non-
Obvious and Patent Non-Obvious II, supra note 4. 
69 Id. 
70 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 316–19 
(1971). 
71 See, e.g., Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 4; Kitch, supra note 4; Duffy, supra note 
4; Wagner & Strandburg, supra note 4. 
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and disclosed) without a patent incentive, patenting it should be avoided. 
This view moves beyond the technical view, in which nonobviousness could 
be assessed in principle simply by polling persons having ordinary skill in the 
art. To determine whether a particular invention exceeds what one of us has 
called the “competitive baseline”72 requires an understanding not only of the 
technology at issue, but also of the social and economic context in which it 
and similar technology is developed. Understanding this context requires 
delving into both technical and economic questions that are not raised by 
the purely technical view. For example, one must account for the problem-
solving methodology and tools available to the PHOSITA as well as for the 
PHOSITA’s ordinary creativity in order to predict where competition alone 
would take innovation. Information about “the effects of demands known to 
the design community or present in the marketplace”73 is needed to assess 
whether a claimed invention goes beyond the innovation that would have 
been inspired by the marketplace without a need for patent protection. 
The Supreme Court in KSR clearly endorses the contextual view of 
nonobviousness when it says, “Granting patent protection to advances that 
would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards progress 
and may, in the case of patents combining previously known elements, 
deprive prior inventions of their value or utility.”74 Its treatment of the 
“obvious to try” doctrine seems similarly inspired by the contextual view. 
There the Court observes, 
[w]hen there is a design need or market pressure to solve a 
problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable 
solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the 
known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the 
anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of 
ordinary skill and common sense.75 
The contextual view adopted in KSR expands the scope of factual 
questions relevant to determining obviousness, suggesting more robust 
interpretations of Graham’s factors, such as the level of skill in the art, and 
secondary considerations, such as long-felt need. It may also suggest 
additional factual inquiries that are relevant to determining to what extent 
an invention exceeds the competitive baseline, such as whether there have 
been collateral technological advances, regulatory changes, or shifts in 
demand that have affected either the cost side or the benefit side of the 
invention context.76 In our longer article, we discuss some of these issues as 
they relate to our model and suggest doctrinal modifications to take this 
broader view of nonobviousness into account. 
While the contextual view of nonobviousness broadens the scope of 
factual underpinnings of nonobviousness, does it compel us to treat 
 
72 Wagner & Strandburg, supra note 4. 
73 KSR Int’l Corp. v. Teleflex Inc.,, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740 (2007). 
74 Id. at 1741. 
75 Id. at 1742. 
76 See, e.g., Wagner & Strandburg, supra note 4; Duffy, supra note 4. 
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obviousness as a question of law? Certainly it moves us in that direction 
because it requires not only an assessment of the current state of technology 
but a counterfactual prediction of what would happen (or would have 
happened when the issue arises in litigation) if a patent were not available 
for a particular technology. Moreover, while a purely technical PTO may be 
better equipped than a district court to assess the technical underpinnings of 
nonobviousness, it may be even less well equipped than a district court to 
confront the economic issues implicated by the contextual treatment of 
nonobviousness, thus suggesting that a court may be better equipped to 
make the ultimate nonobviousness determination.77 Our model is consistent 
with the contextual view, in that it suggests that we should consider 
everything (including shifts in demand, changes in the tools available to 
inventors, changes in non-patent appropriation mechanisms, and advances 
in collateral technologies) that affects the ex ante expected costs and benefits 
to inventors and thus affects their likely choices of research directions. 
Our model provides an additional, and not previously appreciated, 
reason to treat the ultimate assessment of nonobviousness as a question of 
law, however. In our model, the appropriate placement of the 
nonobviousness threshold depends on an assessment of the degree to which 
a particular sort of research produces social welfare spillovers. It also requires 
an assessment as to whether the patenting constraint precludes the use of the 
patent system to promote socially optimal research. The more that social 
benefit exceeds the private benefit to the patentee, the more likely it is that a 
privately optimal choice of research project will be substantially less 
ambitious than the socially preferred project. The choice of nonobviousness 
threshold to prod potential inventors toward more difficult, socially 
preferable research projects depends on a normative assessment of the value 
of social spillovers that seems highly appropriate for judicial resolution, as 
opposed to determination by a factfinder or even an expert agency. 
Both the Supreme Court’s KSR interpretation of the Graham obviousness 
framework in light of the competitive baseline and our model’s implication 
that the nonobviousness threshold should be keyed to social spillovers may 
be used to give practical meaning and content to the way in which the 
nonobviousness determination requires legal analysis over and above the 
determination of relevant underlying technical and economic facts.78 Both 
also indicate what questions the legal analysis should be aimed at answering. 
This kind of structured interpretation of obviousness as a question of law is 
important both to obtain the best results from a social perspective and to 
 
77 This assessment of institutional competency is highly dependent on the 
current structure of the PTO as a purely technical agency. One could imagine that an 
expert patent agency, with the appropriate economic expertise to conduct the 
assessment of what would have been likely without the patent incentive, could make 
such assessments better than a court would be able to do. 
78 See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 4, at 385–86 for a discussion of the difficulties 
that arise when there is no underlying rationale for the ultimate determination of 
obviousness. For an argument that obviousness should not be treated as a question of 
law see, Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realist Approach to the Obviousness of 
Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2008). 
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respond to the criticism that the demise (or at least demotion) of the TSM 
test leaves us with an arbitrary “because it looks that way to the judge or 
examiner” doctrine.79 
V. WHEN A NONOBVIOUSNESS THRESHOLD IS NOT ENOUGH: 
INSIGHTS INTO THE FUNCTION OF CATEGORICAL PATENTABLE 
SUBJECT MATTER EXCLUSIONS 
Up until now, we have assumed in our model that the social value of an 
invention, W(y), is the same whether or not the invention is patented. In 
reality, of course, a patent changes the social value of an invention, as the 
discussions of the tradeoffs involved in patent protection common in both 
case law and scholarly commentary recognize.80 Indeed these tradeoffs drive 
much of patent doctrine. Not surprisingly, they have implications for our 
model of nonobviousness as well. 
Meurer Strandburg 



















Social Cost of Patent
 
 
79 See, e.g., Wagner & Strandburg, supra note 4, for a discussion of problems 
caused by an insufficiently structured obviousness doctrine. 
80 See, e.g., Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 4; KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1746; Graham v. 
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1966) (describing the underlying policy of the 
patent system that “‘the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of 
an exclusive patent,’ as Jefferson put it, must outweigh the restrictive effect of the 
limited patent monopoly. The inherent problem was to develop some means of 
LCB_12_2_ART10_STRANDBURG.DOC 5/22/2008 4:30:04 PM 
2008] PATENT CARROTS AND STICKS 575 
Figure 5 thus further complicates our story and moves us closer to 
reality by allowing the social value of a research project to depend on 
whether or not the inventive entity expects to get a patent. In particular, we 
assume in Figure 5 that a patent imposes a net social cost and that expected 
social value is lower if the invention is patented than if it is not. Thus, in 
Figure 5, for any choice of project difficulty y, W(y) < w(y), where w(y) is 
expected social value without a patent, and W(y) is expected social value with 
a patent. A patent potentially reduces the social value of a given invention 
because patent owners restrict diffusion of patented inventions, because 
patents discourage cumulative innovation, and because of the burden of 
patent litigation costs. It is important to emphasize that w(y) and W(y) 
represent the social value conferred by research project y, assuming it is 
undertaken. To assume that w(y) > W(y) is not to assume that the patent system 
imposes a net social cost, but merely to make the much less debatable 
assumption that for any given research project patenting imposes net social 
costs. A primary purpose of the patent system is to induce prospective 
inventors to move to higher levels (and thus presumably more socially 
valuable levels) of invention. The net effect of the patent system is a tradeoff 
of this higher level of invention against the social costs of patenting which 
may well lead to net social benefits overall. 
If patenting an invention decreases its social value, there are at least two 
important consequences. First, the social cost of patenting generally leads to 
another role for the nonobviousness threshold in addition to its role as a 
“stick” for inducing potential inventors to take on more difficult projects. 
This additional role is familiar from previous case law and commentary. 
Where patenting imposes social costs, a nonobviousness threshold ensures 
that patents are not obtained for the inventions created by pursuing research 
projects like yn, since that project would be pursued even in the absence of 
patenting and its social value is decreased if it is patented. 
Besides this well-appreciated implication of the social costs of patenting, 
allowing expected social value to differ depending on the presence of a 
patent shows that the extent to which the nonobviousness threshold stick can 
be used to encourage socially optimal research is limited. This is because 
when w(y) > W(y), there is a second constraint on the welfare problem of 
choosing the socially optimal research project. We will call it the social cost 
constraint. The social cost constraint implies that optimal patent policy blocks 
patenting entirely—rather than using patenting to induce more difficult 
projects—when the social costs of a patent are too high. Simply put, a less 
difficult project that cannot be patented may be socially preferred to the 
most preferable optimal project that can be induced by the prospect of a 
patent because the patent would create unacceptable social cost. 
Figure 5 illustrates the social cost constraint. Because patenting reduces 
the expected social value of the research projects in this example by a large 
amount, even the optimal patented project is not as socially valuable as the 
optimal non-patented project. The net expected social value at yn is w(yn) – 
 
weeding out those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the 
inducement of a patent.”) 
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c(yn), shown in the diagram as AC. The net expected social value at the 
optimal nonobviousness threshold, O, is W(O) – c(O), shown in the diagram 
as DF. Since AC is greater than DF, the socially optimal choice is yn even 
though the private value is greater at O. Despite the fact that the prospect of 
a patent induces greater technological progress, it would be socially 
preferable in this case to discourage patenting and avoid the associated 
social costs. 
Figure 5 also helps us to understand why a fairly robust nonobviousness 
standard may be a preferable tool for inducing greater levels of technical 
advance than doctrinal changes, such as increased patent term or patent 
scope, that increase the extent to which patentees can appropriate the social 
value associated with their research projects. As patent strength is increased, 
causing V(y) to increase toward W(y) in Figure 5, it also seems plausible that 
the social costs of patenting increase, causing W(y) to decline toward V(y). As 
this happens, it becomes more and more likely that the social value of the 
optimal patented invention is less than that of the optimal unpatented 
invention. Patenting is, therefore, less likely to be able to produce social 
gain. 
The observation that patenting may be socially undesirable in some 
scenarios even if it induces researchers to undertake more technically 
difficult projects is of relevance to the debate over patentable subject matter 
limitations. Patentable subject matter limitations, such as the bans on 
patenting of scientific discoveries and abstract ideas, are motivated explicitly 
by concerns about the high social costs of patent exclusivity for certain 
categories of inventions.81 A common response to those concerns is that 
these social costs are simply a necessary price of further advances. Moreover, 
it is frequently argued that we can achieve our social goal of “promoting 
progress in science and the Useful Arts” by taking a very expansive, virtually 
unlimited view of patentable subject matter and then restraining 
unwarranted patenting using the other tools of patentability analysis, 
including, importantly, the nonobviousness requirement and limitations on 
patent scope.82 
Our model suggests that the nonobviousness requirement and 
patentable subject matter restrictions may be playing two separate, and 
important, roles in regulating incentives for research and thereby illustrates 
why the two doctrines are not simply interchangeable. The purpose of the 
nonobviousness requirement, besides preventing inventors from patenting 
inventions that do not require a patent incentive, is to push inventors to 
undertake more difficult research than they would choose if simply 
optimizing their private benefit. Nonobviousness doctrine should be tuned 
to locate the nonobviousness threshold as near as possible to the socially 
optimal level of research difficulty in the presence of patenting. It should 
 
81 See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589–93 (1978); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 
U.S. 62, 113 (1854). See also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 
S. Ct. 2921, 2922–23 (2006) (Per Curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (dismissing of grant 
of certiorari as improvidently granted). 
82 See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 9. 
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thus be sensitive to the costs of research and to the extent to which particular 
research directions are likely to produce socially beneficial spillovers. 
Our model suggests an entirely different and complementary role for 
patentable subject matter doctrine. Patentable subject matter doctrine 
should be used to identify those types of subject matter for which the social 
costs of patent protection are so high that the increased inventive steps that 
can be induced by offering a patent are simply not worth the costs imposed 
by patenting. Thus, as an example, while offering patents for the discovery of 
new laws of nature might well induce private investors to fund more difficult 
research projects, the social cost of giving one entity control over 
applications of that law of nature may simply be too great to be offset by the 
increased investment in science that the possibility of a patent attracts. 
Our justification of patentable subject matter restrictions depends on the 
assumption that patenting introduces net social costs for a given invention, 
i.e., w(y) > W(y). This assumption is ubiquitous in discussions of patent law; it 
underlies the traditional discussions of patentable subject matter and also 
the traditional assumption that a nonobviousness threshold is desirable to 
avoid patenting advances that would occur without the patent incentive. In 
some cases, however, patents may raise social value compared to the no-
patent case. Exclusivity always has social costs which must be incorporated 
into W(y), as discussed above. Nonetheless, there are two kinds of situations 
in which we could imagine that patenting a particular invention might result 
in higher net social value than not patenting it. Theoretically, this would be 
the case if patenting an invention results in less social cost attributable to 
exclusivity. This situation could arise if trade secrecy were an option and if 
the trade secrecy period were longer than the patent term. Patenting such an 
invention would result in less exclusivity. If this is the case, however, it seems 
likely that the private value of trade secrecy will exceed that of patenting and 
thus the potential social benefits of patenting will not be realized. Another 
way in which patenting could lead to less social cost due to exclusivity would 
be a situation in which non-patent private value is maximized by trade secret 
use of an invention, such as an industrial process, but an inventor who gets a 
patent chooses to license the invention rather than use it exclusively. In such 
a situation, social value could be higher with a patent available than without. 
The other reason that an invention might be worth more to society 
patented than unpatented is that the patent disclosure might be valuable 
enough to offset the social losses due to the greater exclusivity afforded by 
patent protection.83 This may be the case for particular inventions, but it is 
certainly not generally expected to be the case. The social value of patent 
disclosure is not the entire social value of disclosure of the invention but only 
the value attributable to the fact that the patent disclosure comes earlier 
than the disclosure inherent in reverse engineering or independent 
invention, and is perhaps of greater value as a result of the enablement and 
written description requirements. 
 
83 We assume here again that if trade secrecy actually provides greater exclusivity, 
inventors will prefer trade secrecy regardless of patent policy, so that such cases are 
irrelevant to our analysis. 
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The cases in which patenting an invention might increase its social value 
are therefore those in which trade secrecy is an option, inventors would 
choose patenting over trade secrecy, and the social tradeoff favors a longer 
period of patent exclusivity over a shorter period of trade secrecy protection. 
We suspect such cases are relatively rare, but they are interesting here for two 
reasons. First, it seems clear that patentable subject matter restrictions 
should not apply to such cases. Second, it is interesting to note that the 
traditional justifications for a nonobviousness threshold have no force if 
patenting produces positive social benefits for a given invention. However, 
the function of nonobviousness as a “stick” to induce socially beneficial levels 
of research survives even if patenting increases the social value of research 
projects aimed at some objective. 
To summarize, our model suggests that there may be categories of 
invention for which the social costs of patenting are such as to justify a 
patentable subject matter exclusion even if the result of such an exclusion is 
a smaller inventive step and that those categories of invention are 
characterized by large social spillovers and high social costs of patenting. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in KSR provides an opportunity for new 
and more detailed theoretical inquiry into the optimal design of an inventive 
step requirement. The model we present here is an initial foray in that 
direction. The version of the model presented here contains a number of 
simplifications, of course. Two important simplifications are that we consider 
only a single research entity pursuing a single research project and that we 
treat the projects arrayed along the y axis as independent and non-
overlapping both technologically and in terms of eventual patent rights. We 
defer more detailed treatment of the model and its doctrinal implications to 
our longer article, where we address these limitations. Even from the simple 
model presented here, however, we gain insight into the possible reasons for 
having a nonobviousness threshold, the policy questions that underlie the 
treatment of obviousness as a question of law, and the distinct functions of 
nonobviousness and patentable subject matter doctrine. 
 
